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FALUDI FIGHTS BACK: A REVIEW OF BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
MERLE H. WEINER*
Perhaps it is too much to say that Susan Faludi's Backlash: The Un-
declared War Against American Women 1 is to the 1990s what Betty Friedan's
The Feminine Mystique2 was to the 1960s. Faludi's book probably will not
revolutionize women to embark on a feminist journey; yet it does cap-
ture, as Friedan did, an unspoken truth about the interrelationship of
society and its women. It is this naming the unnamed, as Friedan origi-
nally did, that makes Faludi's book well worth reading.
3
The simplicity of Faludi's premise, that a backlash against women's
rights and feminism is occurring, is both one of the book's strengths and
one of its weaknesses. While Faludi amply demonstrates the existence
of a "backlash," she never tells the reader how to reverse it. Instead,
Faludi uses her four hundred-plus pages of text to provide a plethora of
examples, merely establishing that an attack on women's equality exists.
Faludi focuses primarily on popular culture for her support, finding ma-
terial in the media, movies, television, fashion industry and cosmetic in-
dustry. She also documents her thesis by entering the domains of the
new right community, politics and scholarly and popular writers. By the
end of Faludi's book, one either is convinced of her premise by the sheer
number of examples provided or feels exhausted enough to agree.
4
Reading this Pulitzer prize-winning journalist's tome awakens one
to the truth of its underlying message. One starts to see examples of the
backlash everywhere. For example, a recent article by Sally Quinn states
that feminism, like communism in the former Soviet Union, is dead:
Feminism is "anti-male, anti-child, anti-family, anti-feminine," and
* Merle Weiner received aJ.D. from Harvard University and an LL.M. from Cam-
bridge University. Currently, she is an attorney at the Georgetown University Law Center
Sex Discrimination Clinic, Women's Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program. The au-
thor wishes to thank Tom Linninger for his help, although any grammatical errors are her
own.
1. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
(1991).
2. Brn FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
3. Faludi might wince at the comparison with Friedan. In discussing Friedan's THE
SECOND STAGE, Faludi shows quite a bit of disdain for the author, calling her a "fallen
leader," angered by her loss of power. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 322 (citing Brn FRIEDAN,
THE SECOND STAGE (1981)). Faludi accuses Friedan of "yanking out the stitches in her
own handiwork," and Faludi calls THE SECOND STAGE a "thinly documented book that
often reads as if it were dictated into a tape machine," muddled in both language and
logic. Id. at 319, 321, 324.
4. While Faludi was awarded the National Book Critics Circle award for general non-
fiction, some board members understandably felt, "(t)he writing was clunky and had too
much filler." David Streitfeld, Smiley, Roth Win Book Awards, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1992, at
DI.
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therefore, has nothing to do with most women. 5 Feminism, Quinn as-
serts, outlasted its usefulness. Quinn accuses movement leaders of be-
ing hypocritical, of overlooking the "deepest, most fundamental needs
of their constituency," such as women's need for men, children and cre-
ating a happy home atmosphere. She faults feminists' insensitivity to
these needs as "creating a backlash" against abortion rights, earning
power and job promotion in the workplace, and cites Faludi's book for
support.
After reading Backlash, one recognizes that Quinn's message is
twisted. It is an illustrative exercise to imagine how Faludi might ad-
dress Quinn's argument. A technique that reappears throughout
Faludi's book is her bombardment of the enemy (i.e., the reactionary
forces) on all fronts. Faludi's tactics include revealing counter-exam-
ples, exposing methodological flaws, identifying personal short-comings
and magnifying irony. This approach makes her book effective and
characterizes her probable response to Quinn.
Apart from criticizing Quinn for citing her book out of context,
Faludi would directly dispute the content of Quinn's message that femi-
nism is no longer relevant to most women. Faludi, in fact, did challenge
a similar claim when she discussed Sylvia Ann Hewlett's book, A Lesser
Life: The Myth of Women's Liberation in America,6 and its contention that the
feminists failed women by ignoring motherhood. Faludi points out that
most women do not share this belief: "When the Yankelovich pollsters
in 1989 specifically asked, 'Is the women's movement antifamily?,' the
vast majority of women, in every age group, said 'no.'"7 Faludi also
would indicate that Quinn gives no statistics or other evidence to sup-
port her claims regarding women's feelings about feminism.
Faludi then would detail how the women's movement, in fact, works
to help women manage their often dual roles as mother and labor force
participant. Faludi wrote, for example,
In the early '70s, feminists campaigned forfive day care bills in
Congress. Three of the eight points of NOW's original 1967
"Bill of Rights for Women" dealt specifically with child care,
maternity leave, and other benefits. In the following years,
NOW and other women's groups repeatedly lobbied Congress,
staged national protests, and filed class-action suits to combat
discrimination against pregnant women and mothers ...
[W]hen feminists pushed for women's rights in other areas -
employment opportunities, pay equity, credit rights, women's
health - mothers and their children benefitted, too.
8
Next, Faludi would provide support for the antithesis-that it is the new
right and conservatives who are really anti-family:
5. Sally Quinn, Who Killed Feminism? Hypocritical Movement Leaders Betrayed Their Own
Cause, WASH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1992, at Cl.
6. SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN
AMERICA (1986).
7. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 316-17 (citing Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll (Time/CNN
television broadcast, Oct. 23-25, 1989)).
8. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
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[T]he real 'antimotherhood' crusaders weren't feminists,
either; they were New Right leaders, conservative politicians,
and corporate executives, who not only ignored mothers' rights
but attacked them. It was, after all, Phyllis Schlafly, not Gloria
Steinem, who led the opposition to congressional child care
and maternity leave bills for two decades. 9
Finally, she would use her justifiably irreverent style to show the
hypocrisy in Quinn's argument, given Quinn's own personal life choices.
Quinn's life does not reflect that home, family, or traditionally feminine
ideals define women's "deepest, most fundamental needs." Nor does
Quinn's privileged background permit her to speak about what is impor-
tant for most women. For example, after her graduation from Smith
College in 1963, Quinn embarked on a variety of professions: actress,
public relations consultant, political campaigner, newscaster and jour-
nalist. 10 She became a reporter for the Washington Post in 196911 and
published two books, Regrets Only and Happy Endings. One reviewer
called this last book a reflection of Quinn's own "mired truths of mar-
riage and motherhood: . . . Superwoman conflicts of career and
home."12 Quinn's home life, like her career path, has not been "tradi-
tional" either. Without benefit of marriage, Quinn lived with Benjamin
Bradlee, then Executive Editor at the Washington Post, from 1973 until
they eventually married in 1978.13 Even after marrying Bradlee, Quinn
kept her own name. As far as being pro-family and pro-child, Quinn
admitted, "The idea of having a baby was just horrifying.... There were
other things I wanted to do with my life."
14
Quinn's emphasis on family has always been qualified. When she
finally became pregnant at age forty, she confessed, "If there had been
any problems [after amniocentesis], I would have had an abortion ....
Absolutely. No question. It would have been a tough thing to go
through, but I would have done it. I see no reason to bring a retarded
child into the world when you don't have to." 15 When Quinn gave
birth, she immediately hired a baby nurse and an Irish nanny.' 6 So
much for traditional mothering, at least for Quinn. Unfortunately, her
young son suffered heart failure at three months, and now has a congen-
ital heart defect. 17 Quinn admits, "I've hated every minute . . . .
But to a feminist lawyer, Faludi's book signals an area ripe for femi-
nist legal scholarship; although Faludi does not develop her premise in
9. Id. at 317.
10. Margie Bonnett Sellinger, Sally Quinn, The Shark of Washington Society Reporters Makes
a Splash with a First Novel, PEOPLE MAG., Aug. 18, 1986, at 80.
11. ALMANAc OF FAMOUS PEOPLE (1989).
12. Patt Morrison, Hanky Panky on the Potomac, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1991, at 9 (book
review).
13. Thomas B. Rosenstiel, End of a Paper Trail, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at El.
14. Dolly Langdon, Sally Quinn Misses A Deadline but Delivers her Best Story Yet: A Baby Boy,
PEOPLE MAG., May 17, 1982, at 57.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sellinger, supra note 10.
18. Ralph Novak, Staring Mothers, PEOPLE MAG., May 25, 1987, at 16.
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the legal arena. Another author should document the backlash's exist-
ence in this area and expose its impact on women's lives, focusing both
on the setbacks encountered by female legal actors and the harm to wo-
men's equality generally. This sequel to Backlash should discuss harmful
court opinions and reactionary new laws and detail the politics behind
these restrictive measures. The sequel also should expose the clients,
lawyers, judge and politicians contributing to the backlash. And, unlike
Faludi's book, it should attempt to answer how to stop the backlash from
continuing.
While indicating at the beginning of her book that she might be
exploring the backlash in the world of law, 19 Faludi focuses primarily on
popular culture. She asserts that the media and mass marketing,
ushered in with the Victorian era, are "two institutions that have since
proved more effective devices for constraining women's aspirations than
coercive laws and punishments."
20
Faludi does acknowledge the law's historical importance in reflect-
ing the backlash. 2 1 Moreover, she claims that the present backlash af-
fects women's current legal status:
[O]nce again, as the backlash crests and breaks, it crashes hard-
est on these two shores [employment and fertility] - disman-
tling the federal apparatus for enforcing equal opportunity,
gutting crucial legal rulings for working women, undermining
abortion rights, halting birth control research, and promulgat-
ing 'fetal protection' and 'fetal rights' policies that have shut
women out of lucrative jobs, caused them to undergo invasive
obstetric surgeries against their will, and thrown 'bad' mothers
in jail.
2 2
Yet, Faludi merely dabbles in the law, leaving the legal reader want-
ing more detail. The legal reader wants Faludi to invoke her distinctive
style and discuss fully decisions like Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio, 23 Grove City College v. Bell,2 4 Rust v. Sullivan,2 5 Webster v. Reproduc-
19. For example, in her introduction, Faludi tempts the reader with facts about legal
scholarship ("[l]egal scholars have railed against 'the equality trap' ") as well as lawyers
("less than 8 percent of all federal and state judges, less than 6 percent of all law partners"
are women). FALUDI, supra note 1, at xii-xiii. She also teases the reader with statements
about women's legal status. She states (1) opponents of women's rights claim women are
so equal an Equal Rights Amendment is unnecessary, id. at ix, and (2) the current equality
laws are inadequate or ineffective. Id. at xiv-xvii.
20. Id. at 48.
21. Faludi cites, for instance, "the rise of restrictive property laws and penalties for
unwed and childless women of ancient Rome, the heresy judgments against female disci-
ples of the early Christian Church, or the mass witch burnings of medieval Europe." Id. at
47. She also discusses the reaction to the 1848 Seneca Falls women's rights convention,
which triggered the passage of restrictive divorce laws, the prohibition by Congress of the
distribution of contraceptives and the criminalization of abortion in many states. Id. at 48-
49.
22. Id. at 55. Among other things, she contends (1) our reproductive freedom is in
greater jeopardy today than a decade earlier, id. at xiv; (2) Title IX is not being imple-
mented, id. at xiv; (3) marital rape and domestic violence laws are inadequate, id. at xiv; (4)
sexual discrimination in the work force is rampant, id. at xvi; and (5) average child support
payments have fallen. Id. at xvii.
23. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (In Title VII actions, specific discriminatory employment
246 [Vol. 69:2
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tive Health Services, 26 just as she discusses EEOC v. Sears,27 Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,28 Lorance v. AT&T Technologies 2 9
and Christman v. American Cyanamid Co.
30
For example, Faludi's discussion of EEOC v. Sears reveals the type of
marvelous information she can employ to make a case come alive.3 ' In
Sears, the EEOC claimed that Sears discriminated against women be-
cause men held over 90% of commission sales jobs, although at least
40% of the qualified job applicants were women. The average commis-
sioned salesman made twice as much during his first year on the job as
the average non-commissioned female salesclerk, regardless of senior-
ity. Sears defended itself by claiming that women's interests differed
from men's and that women did not want such "demanding" jobs.
Faludi discredits Sears's defense. She discloses, for example, that
once the EEOC started investigating Sears, Sears's management
doubled the proportion of women working in commission sales in one
year. She also quotes several former female Sears employees who
wanted commission work. One woman, Alice Howland, wanted to sell
appliances because it paid more and she was bored in women's clothing
sales, but Sears never allowed her the opportunity. Faludi even con-
ducted her own experiment at a Sears store, interviewing women that
desired, but were refused, commission sales positions.
Faludi provides illuminating information about some of the players
involved in the Sears case. For example, Faludi focuses on Sears's wit-
ness Rosalind Rosenberg, a women's history professor at Barnard Col-
lege, and a friend of Sears's chief defense lawyer. Faludi discusses
Rosenberg's research errors, including her unsupported assumption
that most saleswomen did not contribute significantly to their house-
hold's income. She reveals that Alice Kessler-Harris, a feminist labor
historian at Hofstra University, accused Rosenberg of twisting the mean-
ing of Kessler-Harris' work through the creative use of ellipses. Faludi
undermines Rosenberg further by rhetorically asking the reader how
practices must be shown to have a significantly disparate impact on employment opportu-
nities and once a prima facie disparate impact case is established, employers have only the
burden of production to establish a legitimate business justification for the practice.).
24. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (federal funds only trigger coverage under Title IX for the
specific program or activity receiving federal money, not the entire institution).
25. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, regula-
tions prohibiting recipients from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, or mentioning
abortion as a birth control option do not violate the First Amendment free speech clause
or a woman's due process right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy). See
FALUDI, supra note 1, at 412 (brief mention of this case).
26. 492 U.S. 490 (1989)(state, inter alia, can prohibit governmental aid for abortion
related purposes). This "famous" decision is mentioned by Faludi only in passing. See
FALUDI, supra note 1 at 277, 412.
27. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Il1. 1986). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 378-87.
28. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 388-92.
29. 409 U.S. 900 (1989). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 394.
30. 578 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. W. Va. 1983). See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 440-53.
31. See FALUDI, supra note 1, at 378-88 (discussing EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264
(N.D. I1. 1986)).
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Rosenberg's claim that women "are less likely to make the same educa-
tional investments as men" relates to selling sofas.
Faludi reveals that the government shifted its position in the case
once Reagan became President. Clarence Thomas, then chair of the
EEOC, publicly enunciated such an anti-prosecution stance that Sears's
lawyers considered calling him as a witness. She makes Judge John
Nordberg look ridiculous by explaining how Nordberg demanded that
EEOC attorneys demonstrate that American women ever faced any em-
ployment discrimination. Nordberg, ultimately ruling for Sears, found
that the women at Sears preferred lower-paying jobs.
Contrast this in-depth discussion of EEOC v. Sears with her discus-
sion of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. Faludi explains, and this is
it, that Webster is a "famous... decision restricting women's right to an
abortion .... ,,32 which "ironically, [was handed down] on the eve of
Independence Day."' 33 The statement's brevity masks Webster's signifi-
cance to the backlash analysis.
Webster is not important or "famous" for its substantive outcome.
The plurality opinion, as even Justice Blackmun admits, did little that
was new: "For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed."
3 4
Rather, it is the surrounding politics that provides insight into the back-
lash. First, most women did not support the restrictions Missouri im-
posed on abortion availability. Even Justice Scalia acknowledged the
"carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators,
urging us... to follow the popular will."13 5 Over twenty million women
exercised their abortion right since 1973 and millions of women spent
their entire childbearing years under the umbrella of Roe v. Wade.
3 6
Backlash's sequel should contrast this popular sentiment with the inter-
ests comprising the amicus curiae filed on behalf of the State of Mis-
souri. Such an exercise would provide excellent ammunition for a
Faludi-style attack on the Court's decision.
3 7
Also, backlash analysts want the media's role in the Webster decision
explored. The popular media often criticized the Roe 38 framework as
being "unsound in principle" or "unworkable in practice," although
some scholars claim that these criticisms do not withstand serious scru-
tiny. 39 Certainly, Justice O'Connor's role in Webster needs explaining.
While upholding Missouri's abortion restrictions, Justice O'Connor re-
32. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 277.
33. Id at 412.
34. Webster, 492 U.S. at 560 (1989) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
35. Id at 3065-66 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
36. Brief for Appellees at n.18, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (No. 88-605).
37. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 685 (1990) (arguing that judges should be influenced by political pressures).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. Walter Dellinger and Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and The Supreme Court: The Retreat
from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 (1989).
[Vol. 69:2
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fused to look beyond the statute before her.40 For this, Justice Scalia
chastised her,4 1 scholars called her the "lowest common denominator of
the majority" 4 2 and others felt she was critical to influence in the fu-
ture.43 The addition of Justices Souter and Thomas to the Court may
render her position, as well as most women's opinions on abortion, ir-
relevant. The irony is there to expose.
The lawyer craves a chapter analyzing the credibility that men like
Clarence Thomas and Charles Stewart 44 . have in the legal system, in
comparison to women like Elizabeth Morgan 4 5 or Nancy Cruzan.4 6 Ad-
ditionally, who are the players in the legal arena contributing to the
backlash? The legal reader desires a chapter exploring institutional
legal opponents to women's equality that emerged in the 1980s,4 7 e.g.,
the Solicitor General's office,4 8 business interests4 9 and conservative
legal foundations.
50
40. Webster, 492 U.S. at 526 (O'Connor., J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
41. lId at 532-33 (Scalia., J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
42. James Bopp,Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
157, 159-60 (1989).
43. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989).
44. After Charles Stewart's pregnant wife was murdered in Boston as they left a child-
birth class, Stewart called police from his car phone and said he and his wife had been
robbery victims. Stewart was not a suspect in the death until two and one-half months
after the incident. When he learned of the investigation, he committed suicide by jumping
offa bridge. The MacNeil/Lehrer New Hour, (broadcast, Jan. 4, 1990) (transcript #3639 on
file).
45. Dr. Jean Elizabeth Morgan was incarcerated over 23 months for civil contempt
when she refused to follow a court order that directed her to return her daughter to either
her former husband (Dr. Eric Foretich) or the court's social service agency. Dr. Morgan
alleged Dr. Foretich had sexually abused the child. Although the court heard twice (16
months and 22 months after Morgan's incarceration) that Morgan would never turn over
her daughter and that she felt jail was the only route to protect her daughter, the court
refused to find its contempt power no longer useful. Finally, the appellate court found
"unsupported by the record most of the reasons the trial court gave.., for disbelieving
Morgan's testimony that she would not comply with the court's August 1987 order." Mor-
gan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. App. 1989).
46. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (adult woman's
wish that she forego continued medical care if she were ever to become a "vegetable" not
honored by Supreme Court for lack of "dear and convincing proof" of the patient's desire
once she entered persistent vegetative state).
47. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, Women's Rights Litigation in the 1980s: More of
the Same? 74JUDICATURE 314, 321 (1991) (a wide range of groups opposed women's rights
groups in the 1980s, unlike in the 1970s).
48. The Solicitor General took an active role in the attempt to limit women's rights
during the 1980s. See id. at 320 (the Solicitor General filed against women's rights in 8276
of the cases as amicus curiae under the Reagan and Bush adminstrations). See also Segal,
Courts, Executives and Legislatures, THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL AsSESSMETrr (Charles
Johnson and John Gates eds. 1990); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUsTICE (1987).
49. Faludi mentions one such interest:
It was the Chamber of Commerce, not the National Organization for Women,
that was the single most effective force behind the defeat of the 1988 Family and
Medical Leave Act. (The Chamber triumphed largely by claiming that the legisla-
tion would cost businesses at least $24 billion a year; the General Accounting
Office later put the cost at about $500 million.)
FALUDI, supra note 1, at 317.
50. These would include, inter alia, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Landmark Legal
Foundation and the Northeast Legal Foundation.
1992]
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The lawyer also desires an exploration of thejudiciary's role in the
backlash, a topic that could fill a book on its own. Faludi does mention
how some judges try to dissuade young women, who must use state
judicial "bypass" procedures with parental notification requirements for
minors, from having abortions. 5 1 Yet this only leaves the legal reader
wanting more. Perhaps she should probe into the personal life of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who between 1969 and 1981 opposed gender claims
84% of the time for cases in which he participated.5 2 What personal
background prompts this animus toward women? The legal reader
wants Faludi to expose Massachusetts's Somerville District Court Judge
Paul Heffernan, who mishandled battered-woman Pamela Nigro Dunn's
case. Speaking to Ms. Dunn's batterer regarding the court's denial of
police protection for Ms. Dunn, the judge declared: "You want to gnaw
on her and she on you, fine, but let's not do it at the taxpayers' ex-
pense." 55 Pamela Nigro Dunn ended up dead in the town dump.
5 4
While the above examples could be used to support Faludi's thesis,
it would be more challenging for her to explain a number of judicial
inconsistencies. During the backlash period, the Supreme Court de-
cided many cases that advanced women's equality. For example, in dis-
cussing fetal-protection policies, Faludi mentions United Automobile
Workers v. Johnson Controls.5 5 In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court
found that the company's fetal-protection plan did violate the 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. How does this decision, as well as the
decisions in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,5 6 Califor-
nia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,57 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son,58 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,59 United States Jaycees v. Roberts,60 or
51. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 420.
52. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Sex and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of Judicial
Support for Gender Based Claims, 64 Soc. Sci. 0. 327, 328 (1983). After his ascendancy to
ChiefJustice, the Court adopted the women's rights position in 69%5 of the cases, whereas
before 1986, it had adopted the women's rights position in 77% of the cases. See George &
Epstein, supra note 47, at 321.
53. Eileen McNamara, 'No Quick Fix' in Abuse Case, Judge Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13,
1986, at 1.
54. Eileen McNamara, Judge Criticized After Woman's Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21,
1986, at 1.
55. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
56. 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (affirmative action plan upheld under Title VII where em-
ployer looked to a conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories, and
not to its own prior discriminatory practices, to justify its affirmative action plan and con-
sideration of female employee's gender in its decision to promote her to road dispatcher).
See FALUDI, supra note 1 at 388-93.
57. 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (California law requiring employers to provide leave and re-
instatement to employees disabled by pregnancy was not pre-empted by or inconsistent
with Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Disability Act, in that it met Title VIi's pur-
pose of removing barriers, which favored an identifiable group of employees over other
employees and helped achieve equal employment opportunity). Not all feminists see this
as a pro-women's rights position. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy & the
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 325, 351-70
(1984-85).
58. 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ("hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title VII.).
59. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII covers employment decisions about partnership;
employer may escape liability under Title VII for sex stereotyping only by establishing that
[Vol. 69:2
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Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle6 1 fit into Faludi's statement
that "the courts may have undermined twenty-five years of antidis-
crimination law"? 62 In fact, one study found that the Supreme Court in
the 1980s proved more hospitable to women's rights claims than during
the 1970s.63 Faludi does not address these inconsistencies.
Faludi needs to account for other contrary evidence as well. The
Reagan Administration undeniably disengaged from many programs
that helped women and it did so "on the sly." 64 Simultaneously, an ex-
plosion of government funding for battered women's shelters oc-
curred,6 5 and a proliferation of state laws were enacted to combat
domestic violence.66 Moreover, how does one reconcile the result in the
William Kennedy Smith trial with that in the Mike Tyson trial, or the
positions of feminists arguing for and against pornography?67 How can
one square the increase in the "fathers' rights" lawsuits brought to stop
abortions,6 8 and the Supreme Court's rejection of such a veto power?
69
Another book is needed, focusing on the legal arena, to add depth and
texture to Faludi's thesis that "a powerful counter-assault on women's
rights exists, a backlash, an attempt to retract the handful of small and
hard-won victories that the feminist movement did manage to win for
women."
70
The question remains-who should write the legal sequel? Prefera-
bly, the next book should be written by a feminist legal scholar, one who
can evaluate the state of the law and its impact on women's equality
from an informed perspective. Faludi does not appear up to the task
because she sometimes states facts erroneously or in a misleading way.
legitimate factors alone would have motivated it to make the same decision at the time the
employment decision was made).
60. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination
did not abridge Jaycee members' freedom of speech or expression, nor was it unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad).
61. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (RICO action per-
mitted against persons who trespassed on abortion clinic property, destroyed property
and threatened employees and patients).
62. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 454.
63. George & Epstein, supra note 47, at 314-15 (Supreme Court adopted the pro-
rights position in 727o of the 42 cases it decided with full opinion between 1981 and 1990;
whereas between 1969 and 1980, the Supreme Court supported the women's rights posi-
tion in 58% of the 63 disputes resolved).
64. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 363, 369. See also Merle H. Weiner, Disengagement as a
Political Behavior: President Reagan and Title IX (1985) (unpublished Senior Honors' Thesis,
Dartmouth College) (on file with author).
65. Merle H. Weiner, From Dollars to Sense: A Critique of Government Funding for the Bat-
tered Women's Shelter Movement, 9 LAw & INEQ..J. 185 (1991).
66. Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv.J. ON LEGIS.
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For example, when she discusses in passing Stallman v. Youngquist,7 1
Faludi states, "In Illinois, a woman was summoned to court after her
husband accused her of damaging their daughter's intestine in an auto
accident during her pregnancy. She wasn't even the driver." 7 2 In fact,
the mother was driving.7 3 More importantly, Faludi omits telling the
reader that the Illinois Supreme Court, in a very strong opinion, sup-
ported the women's rights position. Affirming summary judgment in
the mother's favor on her child's claim, the court held a woman could
not be liable for unintentionally injuring her fetus. The Court would
not subordinate a woman's right to control her life to that of the fetus. 74
In fact, it recognized the impossibility of developing a judicial standard
to adjudicate acts and omissions by the mother. It also recognized the
existing prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs about women's reproduc-
tive abilities that might improperly influence a jury.75 Faludi's style
makes her a persuasive polemicist, but it is too imprecise for legal
analysis.
Finally, this criticism indicates Faludi's method of documenting her
research, like her selective use of facts, makes the reader doubt her intel-
lectual honesty. Part of the problem is that Faludi does not use foot-
notes in the classic sense. Rather, a reader is confronted with the
arduous chore of flipping to the back of the book any time he or she
wants to see Faludi's source for a statement. As Faludi employs a system
of notes that relies on the page number and the first few words of a
sentence for identification, she can interweave documented statements
with undocumented statements and no one, other than a diligent editor,
ever knows what is "fact" and what is "fiction." This technique under-
cuts her credibility somewhat, especially when one recognizes some im-
portant statements are not documented 76 and that Faludi's criticism of
others often relies on their faulty methodology. 77
Nonetheless, the shortcomings of Backlash should not detract from
its value as a book that synthesizes and describes the current reactions
against women's attempts to achieve equality. Moreover, Faludi estab-
71. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
72. FALUDI, supra note 1, at 425.
73. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 504 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
74. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
75. Id. at 360.
76. For example, Faludi claims that "in the popular imagination, the history of wo-
men's rights is more commonly charted as a flat dead line that, only twenty years ago,
began a sharp and unprecedented incline." FALUDI, supra note 1, at 46. No citation is
given for her characterization of popular belief. As she often criticizes others for undocu-
mented representations of popular belief, her failure to offer some support for the state-
ment appears hypocritical. Faludi also makes some references to legal reform efforts,
which are undocumented. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 236.
77. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 9-18 (discussing the Yale/Harvard Study, which
asserts that a marriage crunch for baby-boom college-educated women exists because of a
man shortage); see also LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) (au-
thor's undocumented conclusions regarding women and divorce). Faludi often accepts
certain studies' conclusions without exploring, or at least sharing with the reader, the
study's methodology. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 16.
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lishes, albeit indirectly, the need for a feminist legal scholar to document
the backlash thesis in the legal arena, research that could help women
move forward in the 1990s.

